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Vailati, Papini, and the Synthetic




1 According to the standard interpretation, Italian pragmatism is split into two groups. On
the one hand is the mathematician Giovanni Vailati, Peano’s former collaborator, and his
disciple, the economist Mario Calderoni. On the other hand, there are the two “brats,”
Giovanni Papini and Giuseppe Prezzolini, naïve philosophers with eccentric ideas. While
Vailati and Calderoni followed Peirce’s mathematical and logical pragmatism, the other
two articulated a “magical” pragmatism, a kind of relativist, post-modern version of the
original American movement. This latter view can be found in Papini’s description of it,1
and the twofold description of the Italian pragmatism has become a common place of the
scholarship.  However,  our knowledge  of  the  development  of  pragmatism  and  of
contemporary mathematics allow us to suggest a more precise definition of the Italian
movement.
 
2. A Three Stripes Story
2 Let  us  start  by  examining  the  standard  interpretation.  The  source  of  this  twofold
narrative can be found in the dialectical exchange between Calderoni and Prezzolini in
November 1904 and February 1905 numbers of Leonardo, the journal that Papini founded
in 1903.2 This narrative is at the heart of De Waal’s reconstruction of the period (DeWaal
2004), and may also be found in Colapietro (2007) and in other Italian scholars, such as
Garin  (1963),  Santucci  (1963),  and  Dal  Pra  (1984).  The  narrative  is,  however,  not
completely  accurate.  The  April  1905  number  of  Leonardo contained  the  article  “Il
pragmatismo messo in ordine” authored by the Florentine Pragmatist Club, which listed
and described three kinds of pragmatism in Italy (L III/2, aprile 1905: 45-7). The first was
“loyal” to Peirce’s maxim, and apparently took Calderoni as the Italian representative.
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The second,  denoted as “magical  pragmatism,” focused on the “Will  to believe” as  a
power capable of transforming reality. Prezzolini and Papini were identified as belonging
to this camp. In the middle, there was a third stripe represented by those who thought
that Peirce’s maxim was a logical tool for making free choices among various kinds of
postulates. Vailati probably fell into this group. This article concludes with the metaphor
of pragmatism as a “corridor” that James liked so much and attributed to Papini.3 The
articulation of three kinds of Italian pragmatism appeared again in Papini’s February
1906  article  “Cronaca  pragmatista,”  dedicated  to  pragmatism  and  politics  (L  IV/5,
Febbraio 1906: 58-61). The article is open to the notion that there may be even more than
three varieties of pragmatism, a pluralism which, for Papini, is a cause for rejoicing. Thus,
even  if  Papini  sometimes  presented  the  “two pragmatisms”  theory  in  subsequent
writings,  the  two  stripes  theory  is,  even  from  Papini’s  point  of  view,  somewhat
misleading.
3 Connected to  the  misleading notion of  “two pragmatisms,”  there  is  a  notorious  and
mistaken legend that  Papini  and Prezzolini  somehow influenced the rise  of  fascism.4
Curiously, very good scholars like Colapietro (2007) and Bordogna (2015) seem to have
accepted this  misconception.  At  the  bottom of  this  philosophical  “fake  news”  was  a
statement by Mussolini himself who, in an interview with the New York Times Magazine
in 1926, cited William James as one of his philosophical models (O’Hare 1926; Livingston
2016). The post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy runs as follows: Papini imported William James’s
thought  into  Italy,  Mussolini  liked  James,  and  therefore  Papini  was  responsible  for
inspiring Mussolini and fascism. The origin of the fallacious reasoning was an article by
Herbert Read in the Spectator from October 23, 1936 hinting that Papini and Leonardo were
responsible for Mussolini’s acquaintance with James and pragmatism. According to Read,
further proof was supplied by the fact that Mussolini wrote for Leonardo. The story was
completed with the considerations that fascism proclaimed action and an accompanying
transformation of reality as its aims and that Mussolini quoted a statement by James
about “action being judged by results and not by its doctrine” (Read 1936). How could one
doubt the connection? 
4 I presented some counterarguments to this fable in a book I wrote some years ago with
Giovanni Tuzet (Maddalena & Tuzet 2007). Some facts may be helpful to set the argument.
Papini shut down Leonardo in 1907, and at that time he considered his pragmatist phase to
be at an end, so much so that James asked in a letter where that genial “dago” ended up
(CWJ,  12.209).  In  1907  Mussolini  was  24  and  a  self-proclaimed  socialist.  His  favorite
readings were by Marx and Schopenhauer. Fascism was born in 1919; by that time, Papini
was about to convert to Catholicism. Fascism considered Giovanni Gentile’s idealism to be
its official philosophy. Gentile, not Papini, was called to serve as Mussolini’s Minister of
Education. Also, while it is possible that Mussolini remembered something from Leonardo
from 19 years before, there is no proof that he ever read the journal. Read’s statement
that Mussolini was a cooperator with Leonardo is simply false – he never wrote for the
journal. In addition, Mussolini’s quote from James does not accurately summarize any of
the  three  forms  of  pragmatism as  described  in  Leonardo.  At  that  time  almost  every
philosophy was talking about action, including Marxism, to which the young Mussolini
was  certainly  close.  Further,  the  political  ideas  of  Leonardo reflected  a  profound
individualism, a clear allegiance to liberalism, and sometimes, in Vailati’s writing, some
appreciation for Fabianism, a doctrine that mingled socialism and liberalism.5 It is hard to
get politically further away from fascism than these ideas. Finally, it should be noted that
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Papini became a fascist much later, in 1935. He had dismissed pragmatism as youthful
attraction and a mistake as early as 1908, and had then become a follower of theosophy,
then  a  futurist,  then  a  Catholic.  Facing  all  these  facts,  the  idea  of  locating  the
fundamental  link  between  Papini  and  fascism  in  pragmatism  seems  to  be  at  least
arbitrary.
5 Returning to theory, there is a further question about Vailati, one of the “good guys” of
the standard view. Which was his kind of pragmatism? According to the standard view he
should  have  anticipated  analytic  philosophy.  Is  this  true?  Yes  and  no.  He  certainly
advocated for precision of thought and language. He anticipated Wittgenstein’s idea of
philosophy  as  therapy  that  reduces  metaphysical  problems  to  language  issues.  He
appreciated the contemporary development of  logic,  to which he had contributed by
assisting Peano in the compilation of the Formulario. Finally, Vailati hated vagueness. No
wonder that many years after his death he was quoted in the Vienna Circle Manifesto as a
possible precursor. However, as I have noted elsewhere (Maddalena 2007), Vailati had a
strong consciousness  of  the  evolutionary  historicity  of  truth.  He  even allowed for  a
description of science as a “lie,” in accord with a sort of pre-Rortyan view of science
fostered  by  Prezzolini  among  the  Leonardians.6 Moreover,  because  of  his
acknowledgement of the role of historicity, Vailati was a fervent anti-Kantian and agreed
with  Papini’s  attacks  on  the  definition  of  a  priori  necessities,  whether  synthetic  or
analytic.7 The third kind of pragmatism, the one adhered to by Vailati according to the
Florentine Pragmatist Club, relied upon a very close link between ethical choices – even
in an open and declared Nietzschean spirit – and logical/mathematical deductions. Vailati
understood pragmatism as a way to verify consequences but had a sophisticated view of
the psychology that runs beneath the surface of logic. For this kind of psychology Vailati
relied  on  Brentano’s  views  and  his  distinctions  among  representations,  beliefs,  and
volitions.  Of  these three states  of  consciousness  that  respectively  refer  to  sensations
(which can also be images, ideas, or memories), previsions (which can be beliefs, doubts,
fears,  satisfactions,  etc.),  and  value  judgments,  Vailati  is  primarily  interested  in  the
reflection or the impact they have on logic. The first category, representation, is reflected
in “definitions,” “propositions that have the sole purpose of clarifying and analyzing the
meaning of a word or of a sentence” (S II: 88). Definitions can be analyzed as “data” but do
not produce new knowledge. The expansion of knowledge, instead, is given to beliefs that
are reflected in statements regarding “matters of fact,” opinions that may be true or false
“independently of any human convention on the way of expressing them” (S II: 88). Here
ideas and facts find their unity. This level of experience is the one in which hypothetical-
deductive knowledge works. Finally, there are volitions, the “value judgments” which
find their logical equivalent in the choice of postulates or of the “table of values” (S II: 91)
for which expectations will be ordered as means to ends. At this point Vailati meets James
and the other Italian pragmatists:  the will  determines the purposes and on them the
monistic claims of idealism and the rationalist claims of positivism have no power. There
are several purposes and they depend on the individual as he/she emerges from the
socio-historical development, anti-deterministically seen as a necessary but not sufficient
condition.
6 In conclusion, we can say that Vailati was closer to his “magical” friends much more than
is  usually  thought.  If  one  considers  Calderoni’s  reliance  on  Vailati’s  theses  and,  in
addition, considers Calderoni’s own theses (other than those he expressed in his debate
with  Giuliano  il  Sofista),  one  can  say  that  much like  the  American  pragmatists,  the
Vailati, Papini, and the Synthetic Drive of Italian Pragmatism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-1 | 2019
3
common project that united the Italian pragmatists was deeper and stronger than some
of the members of the movement thought.8
7 A final philological question can be asked about what the Italian pragmatists as a group
understood about the original American philosophy and what they added to it. Surely, as
a  group,  they understood that  pragmatism opposed both positivism and rationalism,
while they remained more confused about the distinction between pragmatism on the
one hand and Berkeley’s idealism and Locke’s empiricism on the other. As for rationalism,
they identified Descartes and Kant as theoretical adversaries, exactly as their American
counterparts had.9 They also understood the thick sense of experience that pragmatism
advocated and the overthrow of the ancient dualisms between theory and practice, mind
and  body,  and  norms  and  descriptions  that  was  the  inevitable  implication  of  the
pragmatic maxim. However, they knew only a few of Peirce’s writings and only a few
more  by  James  –  they  missed  the  sophisticated  mathematical,  phenomenological,
semiotic, and metaphysical views that Peirce and James developed in the last phase of
their lives. In particular, Vailati was unfamiliar with the intersection of Peirce’s studies
on continuity and abduction,10 the latter a method of reasoning that would have opened
up Vailati’s views to different, logical and mathematical landscapes.
8 What did the Italian pragmatists add to American pragmatism, leading Calderoni to claim
that Italian pragmatism was an “original” form? They added an existentialist11 and even
nihilist12 leaning that reverberated in their theory about values choice. This theory of
values choice was the link between the magical and logical varieties of pragmatism and
was  also  the  origin  of  some  extremely  innovative  research,  like  that  conducted  by
Calderoni in the field of economics (Calderoni 1906). Italian pragmatists embraced the
philosophical movement from the U.S. because they were looking for answers to vital
problems,  a  thirst  that  was  evident  in  Papini  and  also  in  the  skeptical  attitude  of
Prezzolini. As the correspondence with Papini confirms (Vailati 1971: 319-473), Vailati
comprehended this existential drive and tried to put it in philosophical terms with the
idea of the “third pragmatism.” In the course of applying Vailati’s ideas to economics and
ethics,  Calderoni,  who was Vailati’s  pupil,  had implicitly accepted the third brand of
pragmatism advocated by his mentor much more than he ever admitted. The use of the
collective  name  –  the  Florentine  Pragmatist  Club  –  under  which  all  the  important
pragmatists authored the article that distinguished the three kinds of pragmatism and
the intersections among them, was an index of the common belonging they professed in
the years 1905-6,  the years  in which Vailati  lived in Florence and in which Leonardo
published its most important material.
 
3. Action and Creation. The Peak and the End of Italian
Pragmatists’ Common Project
9 I want to dedicate the last part of this paper to a topic that can illuminate the kind of
theoretical attitude that united the participants in the club, a topic that reveals both their
strength and their weakness. The topic is the conception of action as creation, whose
theoretical side could be seen in the bond between the universal and the particular.
10 In December 1903, Papini, 22 years old at the time, published an article in Leonardo about
the “Death and Resurrection” of philosophy. He adopted his usual apocalyptic tone. He
clearly condemned intellectualist abstraction and generalization as a perennial error in
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philosophy  and  identified  dualisms  between  theory  and  practice,  generality  and
particularity,  as  the  consequences  of  this  erroneous  starting  point.  Philosophical
resurrection must involve turning the generalizing point of view upside down, as well as
“a practical  research and creation of  the particular  and the personal” (L  I/11-12,  20
dicembre 1903: 7). Some of the consequences of this resurrection were simply weird, such
as an appreciation for studies on single strange or miraculous events, magic, and egology,
but  Papini  also  describes  the  unity  of  theory  and practice,  and the  improvement  of
technology as a necessary consequence. After reading the article, Vailati wrote to Papini
highly  praising  the  idea  of  individualization  of  ideas  and  of  moving  to  a  radical
psychology  of  philosophy,13 which  would  make  the  link  between philosopher  and
philosophy much more evident and clear. In a second letter, he takes another step in
Papini’s  direction.  This magical,  practical,  creative activity is  simply what any art  or
science does; he therefore attacks Papini because he thinks that philosophy is special in
this sense, different from other arts and sciences. Certainly, Vailati stresses that creation
cannot be ex-nihilo and criticizes Papini for allowing too much freedom to the will.14
However, after Papini’s response, Vailati understands that the real difference between his
philosophical notions and Papini’s is in the method of this transformation of the world
through  the  embodiment  of  ideas  into  particulars.  As  he  says:  “I  have  no  a  priori
objection to the possibility of educating our will and to its extension to further domains.
However,  I  believe that  the verification of  this  possibility  should be  sought  more in
experiment and induction than in speculation and intuition.” (Vailati  1971:  391).  The
difference is in the tools but not in the goal: Vailati thinks that the enlargement of the
realm of will depends on mediate tools of knowledge, while Papini thinks of these tools as
immediate.
11 In a subsequent issue of Leonardo, Papini returned to the same topic in an article titled
“Martha and Mary, from contemplation to action” (L II/1, marzo 1904: 8). Here Papini
stressed that there is no distinction between the external and internal consciousness and
that consciousness itself is always act and change. Papini considers the magical attitude
as one that emphasizes this normal situation until ideas are transformed into reality: “It
is a difference of measurement not of nature,” he concluded (L II/1, marzo 1904: 8). The
great logician Vailati was not opposed to this goal. In a letter dated November 21, 1904,
Vailati, almost 20 years older than Papini, attempted to make his young friend aware that
this revolution in philosophy was somehow the dream of many philosophers in the past:
concepts are means to an end-in-view, and facts (their production and prediction) are the
goal of any science.15 Vailati tried also to fix Papini’s attention on the research of general
ideas as an effective means of reaching the goal of facts, as an organ that helps produce
them. Vailati also explained the extent to which creativity and imagination are tools for
creating those general ideas, which in turn are tools for the creation of facts. This debate
occurred before Vailati moved to Florence. After he moved, Leonardo changed and many
of the subsequent articles show that Vailati’s idea of saving Papini’s dream and aim was at
the foundation of the pluralist unity that Italian pragmatists found in their club. As we
have seen, a united viewpoint appeared in April 1905 under the name the “Florentine
Pragmatist Club.” In this article, the Leonardians recognized that there were three kinds
of  pragmatism,  but  they  identified  some  common  characteristics:  the  softening  of
theories and beliefs; the relationship between general and particular; the choice of topics
according to the ends in view; the culture of believing; the “corridor” theory, according
to which pragmatism is a method of inquiry and not a system. We are unable to go deeply
into all these commonalities, but I want to underline the conclusion of the theoretical
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part of the article, in which the Leonardians say that “it is easy to see the relationship”
among the theoretical  topics:  “The common goal is  to act;  that is,  to strengthen our
power to modify things. In order to act, you must also forecast and in order to forecast
with  certainty  you  must  have  well-formed  sciences  which  are  fit  for  the  task  and
verifiable. From induction to the Will to Believe there is a continuity which is provided by
the common goal: the aspiration to be able to act” (L III/2, aprile 1905: 46). In a later
paper Papini points out that the difference between pragmatist and positivist explaining
that in the former previsions and consequences are considered to be matters of definition
and  interpretation  as  well  as  of  practical  application  (L  V/1,  febbraio  1907:  26-38).
Leonardians  never  reached  Peirce’s  theory  of  modality  and  its  application  to  the
pragmatic maxim, but they were well aware that rationalism, positivism, and empiricism
were far away from the pragmatic understanding of ideas. The theoretical bond between
the kinds of pragmatism consisted in keeping clear the continuity between induction and
the “Will  to  believe”;  that  is,  in Prezzolini’s  words,  between the first  floor  in which
science works as doorman and the second floor where there is an orderly ability to create
(L IV/4, ottobre-dicembre 1906: 355). This was the particular, theoretical addendum of
the Italians to the original American movement: pragmatism as a way to create. This is
why they could be so inclusive with respect to science, poetry, religion, and art – in every
field we can see the act of creation. In the few months they worked together, Italian
pragmatists thought that creative power must be a particular action that is connected to
the generality of ideas. In creation we see these ideas at work, in concreto. An issue of
Leonardo in June 1905 published three papers on “Belief and Will” by Calderoni, Papini,
and Vailati. They all identified the capacity of foresight as characteristic of the voluntary
will.  Papini  characterized  foresight  as  an  “experiment”  and  listed  various  kinds  of
experiments,  from the  scientific  to  the  “personal,”  pointing  out  that  the  pragmatist
method implies the reversal of the usual doctrine concerning the influence of what we
know on what we do. The contrary is also true: what we do influences what we know. The
passage from direct “intuition” of his early writings to indirect “experiment” was a huge
step for Papini, and possibly the point at which Italian pragmatists could recognize a
common  conception  of  “creation”  as  “continuity  between  induction  and  the  will  to
believe,”  the  point  at  which  they  could  insert  their  existential  leanings  into  the
pragmatist  pattern  (L  III/3,  giugno-agosto  1905:  127-8).16 On the  other  side  of  the
equation, Vailati deepened his focus on both the need for the “use and construction of
examples”  and  for  “contemplation  and  representation  of  ideal,  or  even  fantastic,
situations” that it would be unscientific and unreasonable to forbid (S1: 59-66).
12 This  was a  high point  of  their  common experience.  It  was a  moment in which they
belonged to  pragmatism fully.  In a  book written with Rosa Calcaterra and Giancarlo
Marchetti, we proposed some basic characteristics that classic pragmatists shared: the
acceptance  of  the  pragmatic  maxim,  evolutionism  as  a  method,  continuity  between
reality  and  knowledge,  anti-Cartesianism,  acknowledgment  of  mediate  forms  in
epistemology,  and  an  intertwinement  among  normative  sciences  (and  possibly  anti-
Kantianism) (Calcaterra, Maddalena & Marchetti 2015: 13-8). If you accept those points, it
becomes clear that Papini’s passage to “personal experiment” and the Italian pragmatists
drive to unite imagination and will-deduction-induction into a single continuous action
was the most advanced point of their research. They touched upon something new and
important for the general story of pragmatism in that moment. After Vailati moved from
Florence in 1906, he became more and more attentive to fighting against vagueness and
for  precision,  while  Papini  moved closer  to  occultism.  However,  for  a  moment  they
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proposed an original  form of pragmatism in which love for experiment as particular
action,  rich  realism  well  beyond  any  datum,  an  ampliative  form  of  deduction  and
psychology, a passion for science, and existential questions coexisted. To build something
theoretically new they needed a far most advanced study of mathematical continuity and
the semiotic bases of logic, in order to understand that some experiments are simply the
way in which we act upon the continuity of reality, a reality that is always changing.
Moreover,  they should have undertaken an experiment –  such as  Peirce’s  existential
graphs – in which they could capture reasoning as an act that happens through that
continuity, performing a synthesis,  namely, a recognition of identity through change.
Italian pragmatists stressed the need for a kind of creative knowledge that would involve
not only the analysis of concepts but also the psychology underpinning our emotions,
representations, and choices of value. Perhaps they also needed a different conception of
reasoning, and in particular of synthetic reasoning. Unfortunately, they did not have the
same tools that American pragmatists had. And when Vailati left Florence in 1906, they
lost the united track they had found. However, James was right in thinking that they were
up to something new – a sort of synthetic, existential pragmatism that has only been
vindicated with recent mathematical discoveries (Zalamea 2012; Maddalena 2015).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AA.VV., “Il pensiero di Giovanni Vailati,” Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, vol. 18, No. 3, luglio-
settembre 1963, 275-523.
AA.VV., “Il pensiero di Mario Calderoni,” Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, vol. 34, No. 3, luglio-
settembre 1979, 243-426.
BENVENUTO Beppe, (2003), Giuseppe Prezzolini, Palermo, Sellerio. 
BIONDI Marino, (2001), Giuseppe Prezzolini: diario di un secolo, Bolzano, Centro di Cultura dell’Alto
Adige.
BIONDI Marino, (2006), “Papini saggista. La critica, il giudizio, la memoria,” in Ceccuti Cosimo (ed.),
Papini e il suo tempo, Firenze, Le Lettere, 121-208.
BORDOGNA Francesca, (2015), “‘Thought and Action’: William James, the Magic Pragmatists, and
the Fascist Mystics,” Second European Pragmatist Conference, Paris, 11 September.
CALCATERRA Rosa Maria, MADDALENA Giovanni & Giancarlo MARCHETTI (eds), (2015), Il pragmatismo
dalle origini agli sviluppi contemporanei, Roma, Carocci.
CALDERONI Mario, (1906), Disarmonie economiche e disarmonie morali: saggio di un'estensione della teoria
ricardiana della rendita, Firenze, Lumachi.
CASINI Paolo, (2002), Alle origini del Novecento. “Leonardo,” 1903-1907, Bologna, Il Mulino.
CILIBERTO Michele, (1983), “Tra ‘societas christiana’ e cesarismo: Giovanni Papini,” in Gentili
Stefano (ed.), Giovanni Papini nel centenario della nascita, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 77-104.
Vailati, Papini, and the Synthetic Drive of Italian Pragmatism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-1 | 2019
7
COLAPIETRO Vincent, (2007), “‘Di al tuo amico Giuliano…’ Gli entusiasmi di James e le riserve di
Peirce,” in Maddalena Giovanni & Tuzet Giovanni (eds), I pragmatisti italiani tra alleati e nemici,
Milano, AlboVersorio, 97-114. 
DAL PRA Mario, (1984), Studi sul pragmatismo italiano, Napoli, Bibliopolis.
DE WAAL Cornelis, (2004), On Pragmatism, Belmont, Wadsworth.
GARIN Eugenio, (1963), “Giovanni Vailati nella cultura italiana del suo tempo,” Rivista critica di
storia della filosofia, 18 (3), 275-93. 
GENTILI Stefano, (2003), “L’altra metà. Prezzolini e Papini,” in Ceccuti Cosimo (ed.), Prezzolini e il
suo tempo, Firenze, Le Lettere, 113-43.
JAMES William, (1906), “G. Papini and the Pragmatist Movement in Italy,” The Journal of Philosophy,
Psychology and Scientific Method, 3 (13), 21 June 1906, 337-41.
JAMES William, (1992-2004), The Correspondence of William James (CWJ), ed. by Ignas K. Skrupskelis &
Elizabeth M. Berkeley, Charlottesville and London, University of Virginia Press.
LEONARDO (1903-1907). The abbreviation “L” is followed by volume Roman number, issue Arab
number, date, and page. For instance: L I/1, 4 gennaio 1903: 1.
MADDALENA Giovanni, (2007), “Giovanni Vailati e l’arte di ragionare,” in Maddalena Giovani &
Tuzet Giovanni (eds), I pragmatisti italiani. Tra alleati e nemici, Milano, Alboversorio, 23-42.
MADDALENA Giovanni, (2010), “Peirce and Vailati on Semiotics and Freedom,” Cognitio, 1 (11),
58-68.
MADDALENA Giovanni, (2015), The Philosophy of Gesture, Montreal, McGill- Queen’s University Press.
MADDALENA Giovanni, (2019), “Anti-Kantianism as a Necessary Characteristic of Pragmatism,” in 
Pragmatist Kant, Nordic Pragmatist Network.
MADDALENA Giovanni & Michela BELLA (2017), “William James and Italian Pragmatism,” in David H.
Evans (ed.), Understanding James, Understanding Modernism, New York, Bloomsbury, 249-58.
MADDALENA Giovanni & Giovanni TUZET (eds), (2007), I pragmatisti italiani tra alleati e nemici, Milano,
AlboVersorio.
LIVINGSTON Alexander, (2016), Damn Great Empires! William James and the Politics of Pragmatism,
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
O’HARE MCCORMICK Anne, (1926), “Behind Fascism Stands a Philosophy,” New York Times Magazine,
Sept. 26, 2-3, 18.
PAPINI Giovanni, (1906), Il crepuscolo dei filosofi, Milano, Società Editrice Lombarda. 
PAPINI Giovanni, (1911 [1922]), L’altra metà, Firenze, Vallecchi (4 ed.).
PAPINI Giovanni, (1948 [1994]), Passato remoto, Firenze, Ponte alle Grazie (2 ed.)
PAPINI Giovanni, (1977), Opere. Dal “Leonardo” al futurismo, Milano, Mondadori.
PAPINI Giovanni & Ardengo SOFFICI, (2003), Carteggio IV (1919-1956). Dal primo al secondo dopoguerra,
Roma, Storia e Letteratura.
PIGA Francesco, (1983), “Papini e Nietzsche,” in Gentili Stefano (ed.), Giovanni Papini nel centenario
della nascita, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 244-54.
PREZZOLINI Giuseppe, (1907 [1971]), L’arte di persuadere, Firenze, Lumachi.
Vailati, Papini, and the Synthetic Drive of Italian Pragmatism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-1 | 2019
8
PREZZOLINI Giuseppe, (1925), Le fascisme, Paris, Éditions Bossard. 
PREZZOLINI Giuseppe, (1978), Diario 1900-1941, Milano, Rusconi.
PREZZOLINI Giuseppe, (2001), “Fascismo e cultura,” in Biondi Marino, Giuseppe Prezzolini: diario di un
secolo, 87-100.
QUARANTA Mario, (1986), “Positivismo e marxismo di fine secolo. Lettere di Giovanni Vailati a
Guglielmo Ferrero,” Schema, 8 (2), nuova serie, 269-83.
QUARANTA Mario, (2015), La discussione filosofica nelle riviste del novecento (1900-1970), Padova, Saperi.
READ Herbert, (1936), “The Significance of William James,” The Spectator, Oct. 23, 24.
SANTUCCI Antonio, (1963), Il pragmatismo in Italia, Bologna, il Mulino.
SEGRE Umberto, (1963), “Vailati e la discussione sul socialismo,” Rivista critica di storia della filosofia,
18 (3), 487-98. 
VAILATI Giovanni, (1971), Epistolario (1891-1909), Torino, Einaudi.
VAILATI Giovanni, (1987), Scritti (vol. 1: Scritti di filosofia; vol. 2: Scritti di scienza; vol. 3: Scritti di
scienze umane), ed. by Mario Quaranta, Bologna, Arnaldo Forni. 
VILLA Guido, (1962), Sul pragmatismo logico di Vailati e Calderoni: la questione delle varietà del
pragmatismo, “Memorie della Accademie delle Scienze di Bologna. Classe di scienze sociali,” 10 (5),
188-213.
ZALAMEA Fernando, (2012), Synthetic Philosophy of Contemporary Mathematics, New York,
Urbanomics.
NOTES
1. In 1911, Papini wrote the book L’altra metà, in which he defined the two kinds of pragmatism
that they held during the epoch of Leonardo (1903-1907). On the one hand, there was “il vero
pragmatismo, il  custode della vecchia induzione, il  profeta della previsione, l’analizzatore dei
motivi e dei ripieghi delle scienze, il sentenziatore cauto dei sensi e dei non sensi” (Papini 1911:
17). On the other hand, there was “il gran sogno taumaturgo non mai rinnegato: l’uomo signore
del mondo, la mente creatrice di verità, la volontà madre di miracoli, tutto l’universo una pasta
duttile e docile sotto le mani del nuovo Iddio” (ibid.). As he said in the article “Avvertimento”
(1913):  “Presso di noi il  Pragmatismo si  divise quasi nettamente in due sezioni:  quella che si
potrebbe dire del Pragmatismo logico e quella del Pragmatismo psicologico o magico. Alla prima
appartenevano Vailati e Calderoni ai quali moltissimo deve […] la teoria della scienza e la logica
considerata come studio del significato delle proposizioni e delle teorie. La seconda era composta
da me e da Prezzolini e noialtri, spiriti più avventurosi, più paradossali e più mistici svolgemmo
soprattutto quelle teorie che ci facevano sperare un’efficacia diretta sul nostro spirito e sulle
cose.” (Papini 1977: 7).  For a theoretical formulation of the second stripe of Pragmatism, see
L’arte di persuadere by Giuseppe Prezzolini (1907).
2. The dialectic exchange between Prezzolini and Calderoni started in L II/3, novembre 1904: 3-8.
Hereafter, I will use L for referring to the journal Leonardo, followed by volume Roman number,
issue Arabic number, date, and page. The aforementioned reference is to Leonardo,  volume II,
issue 3, November 1904, pages 3-8. The discussion on pragmatism continued on L III/1, febbraio
1905: 15-21 and ended on L III/2, aprile 1905: 48. As for the history of Leonardo, see Casini 2002,
and Quaranta 2015.
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3. In G. Papini and the Pragmatism Movement in Italy (1906) James writes: “Pragmatism according to
Papini  […]  is  like  a  corridor  in  a  hotel,  from  which  a  hundred  doors  open  into  a  hundred
chambers. In one you may see a man on his knees praying to regain his faith; in another a desk at
which sits some one eager to destroy all metaphysics; in a third a laboratory with an investigator
looking for new footholds by which to advance upon the future. But the corridor belongs to all,
and all must pass there. Pragmatism, in short, is a great corridor theory.” (James 1906: 33).
4. In 1922, the year of the fascist march on Rome, Prezzolini wrote in his diary: “il fascismo è
grossolano, incolto, mette sotto i piedi la libertà e minaccia la politica estera.” (Prezzolini 1978:
363). Some years later, he published in France an essay called Le fascisme (1925), hit by fascist
censorship (for the history of this work see Biondi 2001). In a letter to Soffici on the 15th of
September 1919, Papini writes: “L’Italia, in apparenza, è oggi rappresentata da tre energumeni
sifilitici [syphilitic energumenes]: D’Annunzio, Mussolini e Marinetti. Ma tu sai che l’avvenire non è lì e
non è coi loro.” (Papini & Soffici 2003: 45). Michele Ciliberto wrote about Papini’s late connection
to fascism: “Non è dunque il fascismo come ristrutturazione istituzionale, statuale, in termini
reazionari  di  massa,  della  nazione  italiana,  che  attrae  Papini.  E  neppure  lo  stimolano […]  le
proposte  di  tipo  corporativistico  […].  Ciò  che  nel  fascismo  gli  sembra  essenziale  non  è
l’organizzazione delle masse […] Ciò che lo attrae e convince è la figura del duce, del capo, del
cesare, il ruolo da essa svolto sul piano politico e anche ideale, culturale.” According to Ciliberto,
the philosophical link between the late Papini and fascism is not the ideology but the strong
attraction for cesarismo, the need of a Cesar, as typical character of Italian history (Ciliberto 1983:
95). In his work about fascism, Prezzolini says: “La parola d’ordine del fascismo è azione, non
pensiero. Non è stato preparato o proceduto da un movimento ideale; si ricollega alla guerra, che
non dà modo al pensiero di esercitarsi, e alla giovinezza, che non è la stagione della vita più
adatta  alla  riflessione  […]  Il  fascismo  è,  sotto  questo  aspetto,  indice  di  grossolanità  e
impoverimento intellettuale. Leggendo la produzione degli anni del dopoguerra e confrontandola
con quella anteriore si ha la sensazione che il progresso allora raggiunto si sia in parte perduto. È
un po’ come immaginare dei contadini che tolgano da una borsa chirurgica trovata nei campi i
ferri pieni di ruggine e si mettano a fare delle operazioni!” (Prezzolini 2001: 87-8).
5. Vailati’s political writings are collected in the third volume of his complete works (S3). Segre
1963, and Quaranta 1986 provided a good account of his political views. 
6. In L’arte  di  persuadere (1907), Prezzolini  says:  “Non v’è dunque grande differenza […] tra il
ragazzo che nasconde una scampagnata con una lezione straordinaria e attribuisce al  gatto i
furtarelli commessi nella credenza casalinga, e lo scienziato che inventa atomi, particelle, eteri
ed  altri  personaggi  della  sua  mitologia  scientifica per  i  bisogni  di  coesione  della  scienza.  Lo
scienziato è un bugiardo utile collettivamente, il bugiardo è uno scienziato utile egoisticamente. La bugia è
dunque il portone d’ingresso della scienza.” (Prezzolini 1971: 105). In 1907 Vailati writes a long
review of Prezzolini’s book under the head of Un manuale per i bugiardi. In the review, he agrees
with  Prezzolini’s  paradoxes:  “Perfettamente  fondate  a  questo  riguardo,  nonostante  il  loro
carattere  paradossale,  mi  sembrano  le  considerazioni  che  conducono  il  Prezzolini,  nel  suo
volume L’arte di persuadere, a stabilire un parallelo tra le costruzioni delle ‘bugie’ e quella delle
teorie scientifiche.” (S1: 82).
7. In a letter written to Papini in 1903, Vailati said that the apriori is a “illusione dell’evidenza,
derivante  […]  da  una  rapida  oscillazione tra  due  significati  affatto  diversi  di  una  data  frase”
(Vailati  1971:  371).  In  his  first  book,  Crepuscolo  dei  filosofi,  Papini  follows  Vailati’s  teaching:
“L’apriori, in Kant, è piuttosto un articolo di fede che una teoria critica, e il devoto kantiano
dovrebbe aggiungerlo alle cose che bisogna credere senza poterlo dimostrare.” (Papini 1906: 29).
For an overview of Vailati’s attacks to Kant see Maddalena (2015: 16-8).
8. For  the  mutual  links  between  Calderoni  and  his  master  (and  their  relationship  with  the
American pragmatists) see the issues dedicated to their thoughts by Rivista critica di storia della
filosofia in 1963 and 1979, as well as Villa 1962.
Vailati, Papini, and the Synthetic Drive of Italian Pragmatism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-1 | 2019
10
9. For an overview of anti-Kantism as fundamental characteristic of pragmatism see Maddalena
(2015:  10-9).  The  problem with  anti-Kantism as  intrinsic  to  pragmatism is  always  related  to
Peirce’s attitude towards the German master. Peirce changed his mind over the years and arrived
to a profound anti-Kantism. The story of this change is documented in Maddalena 2019.
10. Vailati wrote only one review of Peirce’s articles (see S1: 361-2).
11. The existentialist way is the real element of novelty that the Italians added to pragmatism
(Maddalena & Tuzet 2007).  According to Sandro Gentili,  Prezzolini  and Papini tried to find a
discipline committed to a practical, existential aim. “Cercarono di disciplinarsi attraverso uno
scopo che abbia una possibilità di traduzione pratica e sembra indirizzarsi a entrambi, in una
sorta  di  pragmatismo  non  più  gnoseologico  ma  esistenziale.”  (Gentili  2003:  133).  In  another
article,  Biondi  maintains:  “L’intreccio  fra  cultura  e  vita  era  strettissimo,  ed  era  un intreccio
pragmatista.  Un  pragmatismo  cognitivo  ed  esistenziale.”  (Biondi  2006:  144).  Benvenuto  2003
considers the young Prezzolini as an existentialist nihilist.
12. Francesco Piga worked on the connection between Papini and Nietzsche. “È evidente che
l’invettiva di Papini, il tono forte e accusatore degli articoli del ‘Leonardo’ e delle stesse pagine de
Il Crepuscolo dei filosofi e di Un uomo finito risalgono scopertamente alla lettura di Nietzsche.” (Piga
1983: 247). Papini’s interest in Nietzsche was a stimulus for Vailati; in a letter sent to Papini in
1904,  Vailati  wrote:  “Che Nietzsche dicesse  male  di  Spencer,  prova che sentiva  il  bisogno di
contraddirlo come ogni discepolo intelligente ha bisogno di contraddire al suo maestro. La sua
dottrina filosofica porta l’impronta di una continua evoluzione verso la teoria dell’evoluzione,
accompagnata dal desiderio di oltrepassarla.” (Vailati 1971: 383). The same statement appears in
the review that Vailati wrote on Orestano’s book about the strongholds of Nietzsche’s thought
(see S1: 329-33).
13. In the letter Vailati writes: “[…] la ‘filosofia,’ dopo essere andata diventando a poco a poco […]
la storia di se medesima, non deve fermarsi a mezza strada e deve trasformarsi risolutamente
nella […] psicologia della filosofia o, più precisamente, nella ‘psicologia dei filosofi’  (Philosophen-
Psychologie, la quale comprende invece lo studio delle manifestazioni meno individuali, più gregarie
dello spirito umano: politica, tecnologia, folklore, religione, etc.) Ciò che dici della filosofia come
documento, non potrebbe essere meglio detto, ed è impossibile resistere all’impulso di trattare
subito come documento anche quella stessa tua filosofia che si propone di studiare le altre in tal
modo.” (Vailati 1971: 384).
14. “[…] questa ‘attività creatrice, magica,’ etc., da che cosa distingue la filosofia? Se essa non la
distingue dall’arte […] non la distingue neppure dalle scienze particolari, ciascuna delle quali, nel
proprio campo speciale, è o può essere altrettanto creatrice o magica quanto l’arte e la filosofia
nel loro. Un chimico che compone un nuovo profumo o un nuovo veleno, un ingegnere che fa un
impianto elettrico, un allevatore che crea una nuova specie o varietà di bachi da seta o una nuova
razza  di  cani,  uno  psicologo  o  un  educatore  che  forma  (o  perverte)  un’anima,  etc.,  sono
perlomeno altrettanto creatori quanto il costruttore di nuovi schemi filosofici, o il cesellatore di
nuovi  aforismi o il  coniatore di  nuove ‘parole d’ordine’  (o  di  ’disordine’)  atte  a  servire nelle
logomachie filosofiche, o lo scopritore di nuove giustificazioni per gli istinti umani, etc., etc. […]
Le verità, le leggi di natura, etc., sono rotaie su cui i fatti, e in particolare le nostri azioni, si devono
muovere; tu, dal tuo istinto di libertà, sei portato invece a concepire l’uomo come una nave che
crea la propria rotta e non ha solchi davanti a sé, ma solo di dietro, cioè quelli che essa stessa fa.”
(Vailati 1971: 386-7). 
15. Vailati says: “Che vi sia una differenza tra un concetto e un fatto, tra un’idea astratta e una
sensazione concreta, non vi sarà nessuno uomo che te lo neghi. Sul valore di questa differenza,
cioè, in altre parole, sulla questione: quale delle suddette due categorie di fatti mentali abbia
carattere di fine rispetto all’altra (nel senso ben preciso di ‘fine,’ che tu determini così bene nelle
prime pagine di quel capolavoro che è l’opuscolo sulla previsione); sulla questione insomma del
compito dei concetti e delle idee generali, come puoi attribuire ai filosofi in genere, o anzi alla
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filosofia, di avere un solo parere, quello opposto al tuo, mentre una metà almeno (il ballottaggio si
potrebbe  tentare)  dei  più  grandi  filosofi  del  passato  (i  quali  lo  sono  anche  del  presente)  è
precisamente d’accordo con te, salvo lievi sfumature dovute al diverso modo d’esprimersi e alle
diverse lingue in cui scrissero, nel sostenere che i concetti sono dei mezzi e che i fatti (cioè la loro
produzione e previsione) sono il fine di ogni scienza e d’ogni speculazione.” (Vailati 1971: 425-6).
16. In the same issue Papini published his article on the congress of psychology held in Rome in
1905 (123-4). The three papers are in fact the summaries of the papers that Vailati, Calderoni and
Papini read in that place. Another review of the congress is by Vailati (S3: 153-4). During the
congress  the  Italian  pragmatists  met  William James,  who was  the  guest  star  of  congress.  In
Passato remoto,  many years later, Papini remembered their private meeting during those days,
underlining James’s kindness and openness of mind (Papini 1948). James famously wrote to his
wife Alice an enthusiastic comment about the encounter (CWJ, 11,26). See also Maddalena & Bella
2017.
ABSTRACTS
According to the standard interpretation, Italian pragmatism is split into two groups. On the one
hand is the mathematician Giovanni Vailati, Peano’s former collaborator, and his disciple, the
economist Mario Calderoni. On the other hand, there are the two “brats,” Giovanni Papini and
Giuseppe  Prezzolini,  naïve  philosophers  with  eccentric  ideas.  While  Vailati  and  Calderoni
followed Peirce’s mathematical and logical pragmatism, the other two articulated a “magical”
pragmatism, a kind of relativist, post-modern version of the original American movement. The
paper shows that this narrative is incomplete. During the years 1905-6, while Vailati was living in
Florence, Italian pragmatists listed three kinds of pragmatism among themselves. Relying on the
third stripe, attributed to Vailati, they found a more Unitarian, theoretical project that united
the will to belief and the precision of reasoning. The unity did not last very long because Vailati
moved from Florence in 1906. However, the common project from 1905-6 remains the highest
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